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Abstract
We argue that a patent system makes collusion among innovators
more di¢ cult. Our simple argument is based on two properties of the
patent system. First, a patent not only protects against infringement
but also against retaliation by former collusion members. Second, a
deviator has an equal chance with former collusion members to get a
patent on new innovations. We show that if a patent system reduces
spillovers, it renders collusion impossible. Moreover, it is possible
to design a patent system that simultaneously increases knowledge
spillovers and eliminates collusion.
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11 Introduction
It has been traditionally thought that there is a tension between competition
and patent laws almost by de￿nition. The thinking is so widespread that
most modern discussions of the boundary of competition and patent laws
carefully deny such tension.1 The apparent tension arises from the goals of
the laws. Patent laws create the necessary incentives to innovative activity
by granting a temporary monopoly over an innovation, thus compensating
for the costs of the innovative e⁄orts. In contrast, competition laws recog-
nise the ine¢ ciency of monopoly and guard consumer surplus by promoting
competition. Over the past decades courts have become increasingly toler-
ant towards the privileges of patent holders, but the tension continues to
surface in many prominent antitrust cases such as Microsoft.2 In this study
we support the modern notion of downgrading the tension. But whereas
on-going debate aims at ￿nding the proper balance between competition and
patent laws, we argue that there is no tension in a deeper level. Although
antitrust authorities seldom accept monopolies, they have especially hostile
attitude towards cartels where ￿rms in the same industry collude to produce
as a monopoly and divide the pro￿t. We show how the patent system makes
sustaining collusion among innovative ￿rms more di¢ cult, if not impossible.
Our ￿nding emerges from two properties of the patent system. First,
when a ￿rm holding an unpatented innovation deviates from the collusion,
1Cf., e.g., "Competition and patents are not inherently in con￿ ict. Patent and antitrust
law are actually complementary..." (Federal Trade Commission Report, 2003, p.2.)
2See Kortum and Lerner (1999) and Rahnasto (2003) for descriptions how the balance
between competition and intellectal property laws has varied over time. Rahnasto (2003)
also reviews numerous court cases centered around the issue.
2the best deviation is to patent. In addition to the usual increase in instan-
taneous pro￿ts on the period of deviation, patenting generates a stream of
future pro￿ts, since the patent by design provides protection from retaliation
by the former collusion members. Second, because the deviator and other
former collusion members also compete on an equal footing for patents over
future innovations, the deviator can obtain positive pro￿ts in the retaliation
phase. Thus, collusions where ￿rms hold unpatented or secret innovations
are hard, if not impossible, to maintain. The second property of the patent
system guarantees that even if the ￿rms collude with patented innovations,
the patent system makes deviation more attractive.
Our analysis yields straightforward policy recommendations. In indus-
tries where ￿rms have a tendency to collude without patents, expanding
the patent strength and its subject matter will yield a welfare improvement.
Abolishing the prior-user rights in the patent systems would also be desirable
because it would make collusion more di¢ cult. For a similar reason, a shift
from the ￿rst-to-invent rule to the ￿rst-to-￿le rule without prior-user rights
would be desirable. As the ￿rms can to some extent improve their ability
to collude by ￿ling joint patent applications, joint patents and research joint
ventures warrant surveillance by antitrust authorities.
Although almost all studies on the patent system implicitly deal with the
con￿ ict between competition and patent laws, until recently only few have
addressed it explicitly. The recent literature usually focuses on a speci￿c
question such as whether a patent pool or a collusion between ￿rst and sec-
ond generation innovations should be allowed or not (see, e.g., Scotchmer and
Green, 1995, Chang, 1995, Shapiro, 2001, Denicol￿, 2002, and Lerner and Ti-
3role, 2004). Carlton and Gertner (2003) take a broader view in arguing that
the failure to recognise the tension between competition and patent laws can
lead to errors in the adoption of traditional antitrust analysis to innovative
industries. The patent-antitrust con￿ ict has more often been explicit in the
legal literature (see Rahnasto, 2003, for a survey of the literature). Tradition-
ally patents have been regarded as a source of monopoly power, but scholars
such as Dam (1994) have argued that the pricing power derived from patents
has been exaggerated. Modern view considers patent and antitrust laws dif-
ferent means promoting the same goal, consumer welfare. Nonetheless, even
under such a positive view some tension remains between the two laws and
the problem is to ￿nd a proper balance between them (see, e.g., Federal Trade
Commission, 2003 and Rahnasto, 2003). We tackle the patent-antitrust con-
￿ ict from a slightly di⁄erent angle. To the best of our knowledge we are the
￿rst to uncover the advantage of the patent system in hampering collusion.
Our model is a simpli￿ed version of Kultti, Takalo and Toikka (2003)
who develop a dynamic model of innovation where agents ￿nd ideas accord-
ing to an urn-ball process. A novel feature of the model is that ￿rms can
come up with similar innovations. Kultti et al. (2003) show that this fea-
ture can make patenting a dominant strategy over secrecy even if the patent
protection is weak, since if a ￿rm does not patent, someone else might do
it and thereby prevent the use of the ￿rm￿ s innovation. In this study we
continue to view innovation potentially simultaneous as it renders our argu-
ment transparent. It also seems that such simultaneous model of innovation
especially characterises technology-intensive network industries where ￿rms
are typically working with the same basic technology or components (Rah-
4nasto, 2003, and Varian, 2003). It has therefore become di¢ cult for a single
company to claim status of an inventor of a new technology.
We present our idea in a simple duopoly example in the next section and
then in sections 3-4 generalise the model to allow for an arbitrary number of
￿rms, repeated innovation, knowledge spillovers, and multimarket contact.
Patent policy is introduced in section 5. We touch upon the e⁄ects of patents
on the incentive to innovate and consumer surplus, and establish some wel-
fare implications in section 6. We conclude with presenting some testable
hypothesis in section 7.
2 An Example
Before going to the full model, we illuminate our basic argument in a stan-
dard in￿nitely repeated version of the Bertrand duopoly. There are two ￿rms
that have come up with a similar innovation. The ￿rms compete in Bertrand
fashion which implies zero pro￿ts for each of them, unless the ￿rms can sus-
tain collusion where they equally split the monopoly pro￿ts ￿. To investigate
the sustainability of the collusion, we evaluate the equilibrium strategy pro-
￿le where each ￿rm charges the monopoly price as long as the other ￿rm
did so in the past. If one or both ￿rms deviate, the ￿rms are assumed to
charge the competitive price forever after. With Bertrand-competition this
constitutes the optimal punishment strategy (Abreu, 1988).
Let us ￿rst consider an economy or an industry where patenting is infea-
sible. If the ￿rms collude, they share the monopoly pro￿ts each earning a
pro￿t of ￿=2 per period. Denoting the discount factor by ￿, the discounted
5sum of pro￿ts from collusion is given by ￿
2(1￿￿). By deviating from collusion a
￿rm can reap the monopoly pro￿ts in the period of deviation. As the pro￿ts
in the punishment stage are zero, the collusion can be sustained if ￿
2(1￿￿) ￿ ￿
or if ￿ ￿ 1
2.
We introduce patent policy in a rather crude but standard way. If a ￿rm
has a patent on an innovation, it receives a temporary monopoly over it. Let
us assume that the patent is in force for T periods. After the patent expires,
the innovation becomes public and the other ￿rm can use it for free. Thus,
if one of the ￿rms patents it receives a pro￿t of
￿(1￿￿T)
1￿￿ and the other ￿rm
gets nothing. If both ￿rms apply for a patent, the patent holder is selected
by a lottery so that both ￿rms have an equal probability of 1=2 of receiving
the patent and the associated pro￿ts:
Patent policy does not a⁄ect payo⁄s from collusion but it crucially a⁄ects
the payo⁄s in the case of a deviation. As the patent also provides temporary
protection , the best deviation is to patent the innovation. Now the collusion
can be sustained if ￿
2(1￿￿) ￿
￿(1￿￿T)
1￿￿ or if ￿
T ￿ 1
2. Thus, if the patent is in
force for at least two periods, the patent system makes it more di¢ cult to
sustain collusion. The reason is simple: the patent not only gives a temporary
monopoly over the innovation, but it also provides temporary protection
against the punishment by the former collusion partner. Moreover, patenting
is a strictly dominant strategy when ￿
T < 1
2.
An assumption underlying our argument above is that the duopolists can
make similar innovations. We will next model such innovation process ex-
plicitly. We also generalise the above example by allowing for repeated inno-
vation, knowledge spillovers, multimarket contact, and an arbitrary number
6of ￿rms.
3 The Model
The economy is of an in￿nite horizon and proceeds in discrete time. There
are A agents who innovate and each of whom has the same discount factor
￿. There are also I ideas or potential innovations, and the agents contact
them randomly. Following O￿ Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) we
distinguish ideas from innovations: only ideas that are found constitute in-
novations. This innovation process is just the urn-ball model familiar from
the literature on random matching (see, e.g., Wolinsky, 1988, and Lu and
McAfee, 1996). Because the number of agents is A and the number of ideas






. In other words, an agent always ￿nds an idea but
there may or may not be other agents who ￿nd the same idea. From the
point of view of any single agent, the probability that there are exactly k














Until section 6 we view the con￿ ict between antitrust and patent laws
from the antitrust perspective. So for the moment we abstract from the
much studied issues related to the incentives to innovate and patent policy
by assuming that innovation is costless.
We assume that an innovator can keep a certain proportion ￿ of the
7innovation secret. This means that proportion 1 ￿ ￿ of it becomes public;
this is the spillover e⁄ect that can be controlled by the patent policy. We
model this so that with probability ￿ a new innovation stays private and
with probability 1 ￿ ￿ secrecy leaks out. When the secrecy leaks out, the
innovation becomes public so that anyone can use it. As a result, production
is at the competitive level. The innovations become obsolete with probability
1 ￿ ￿. It is assumed that the probabilities remain the same each period;
one could as well think that whether innovations remain pro￿table or not
is determined only once. We focus on a steady state equilibrium where the
stock of innovations remains the same from period to period.
The timing of events within a period is the following: First the agents ￿nd
ideas, then the new innovations become either public or remain private, then
the agents consume and pro￿ts accrue to those who possess innovations,
and ￿nally the innovations (both new and old) either become obsolete or
remain economically viable. Changing the timing of events does not a⁄ect our
￿ndings. We would also like to point out that the possibility of simultaneous
innovation is not the feature that drives the results. The model would work
in a similar way if the agents could ￿nd the same innovation that was made
earlier by some other agent but this would be harder to analyze.
We postulate that to each innovation corresponds a demand function
that generates a monopoly pro￿t ￿ when the monopoly price is charged.
The monopoly naturally emerges if only one innovator ￿nds an idea that can
be maintained in secrecy. When many innovators come up with an idea we
assume that competition is of Bertrand-type so that the innovators charge
the competitive price, driving their pro￿ts to zero. If the innovators collude
8and charge the monopoly price, they share the monopoly pro￿t equally.
4 Collusion without Patent Policy
We want to determine when collusion can be sustained in an economy with-
out patents. The analysis follows the standard repeated-game treatment of
collusion. We evaluate a trigger strategy pro￿le where each innovator charges
the monopoly price as long as all other innovators did so in the past. If one
or more players deviates, the innovators are assumed to play the stage-game
equilibrium strategy charging the competitive price forever after.
Without loss of generality we focus on an innovator who has no previous
innovations. Deviating from collusion in case the deviator makes an innova-
tion yields a one period monopoly pro￿t but zero after that. If the innovator
had n other innovations he would, of course, deviate from collusion in all
markets simultaneously and the immediate pro￿t would be roughly n-fold
compared to the case of an innovator with no innovations. The future loss
would also be approximately be n-fold. Although this is not quite accurate
since the pro￿tability of deviation depends on the number of colluding part-
ners, it is evident that considering an innovator with n previous innovations
would complicate the analysis without adding insights.
The expected life-time utility of an innovator who has no innovations and
who colludes whenever she comes up with an innovation is determined by







+ ￿￿Uk + (1 ￿ ￿)￿V
￿
; (2)
9where ￿(k) is the probability that exactly k other innovators ￿nd the same
idea, as de￿ned by (1), and where
Uk = V +
￿￿
(k + 1)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)
(3)
is the innovator￿ s expected utility when she has one innovation with k other
colluding innovators. By stationarity, these utilities do not depend on time.
The way ￿, the common discount factor, enters into (2) shows that the value
function is evaluated in the very beginning of a period.
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (2) comes from the possibility
that the new innovation immediately becomes public. This occurs with prob-
ability 1 ￿ ￿, and then the innovator gets V next period. The second term
is composed of the expected pro￿ts when the new innovation stays private.
The innovator￿ s pro￿t share depends on the number of the other innovators
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￿A￿1￿k k other innovators ￿nd the idea and each innovator
makes pro￿ts ￿=(k+1). Then with probability ￿ the new innovation remains
useful. In such a case the innovator￿ s utility in the subsequent period is given
by (3). With probability 1￿￿ the new innovation becomes obsolete and the


















be the expected pro￿t share from collusion. Then, inserting (3) and (4) into




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)
: (5)
Equation (5) shows that the model behaves nicely. The return on collusive
innovation is the larger, the larger is the monopoly pro￿t (￿), the higher is
the discount factor (￿), the smaller is the spillover rate (1 ￿ ￿), the smaller
is the obsolescence rate (1 ￿ ￿), and the larger is the expected pro￿t share
from collusion (￿).
We next calculate the expected life-time utility of an innovator who de-
cides to deviate from collusion. Because the innovators are using trigger
strategies, the deviating innovator earns maximum pro￿t, ￿, during the pe-
riod of deviation but receives zero forever after that, except when she man-
ages to ￿nd an innovation alone. By the one-stage deviation principle, it
su¢ ces to consider the case where the deviator decides to deviate in a cer-
tain period and not after that. Further, it turns out to be useful to consider
the case where the deviator only deviates when she ￿nds the innovation with
some ￿xed number n of other agents.
The expected life-time utility of a deviating innovator is then given by
















￿ ￿￿Un ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿V
￿
where e V and V D denote the utilities of the deviating innovator and of an inno-
vator who deviated in the previous period. The ￿rst term on the right-hand
11side of (6) captures the utility when the innovation immediately becomes
public in which case the deviation decision is inconsequential. The second
term is the expected utility from collusion if the innovation does not become
public. Here also the case of n other agents is included, but as in this case the
innovator deviates, it is subtracted in the third term that re￿ ects the payo⁄
from deviation. There the ￿rst term in the square brackets is the immediate
utility from deviation and the second is the expected utility after deviation.







1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿V
D￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿￿(0))￿V
D: (7)
As the punishment renders the market where the deviation occurred compet-
itive, the deviator has no pro￿table innovations unless she manages to ￿nd a








captures the expected utility of an agent who has deviated and who pos-
sesses a monopoly to exactly one invention. In (7) the ￿rst term on the
right-hand side is the expected utility from making a new innovation alone.




￿A￿1 there are no other innovators. With
probability ￿ the new innovation remains private, and the deviator receives
monopoly pro￿ts. With probability ￿ the innovation remains useful, and the
deviator￿ s utility in the subsequent period is given by (8). With probability
1￿ ￿ the new innovation becomes obsolete and the deviator is again without
pro￿table innovations. The second term is the expected utility when either
12someone else ￿nds the same idea or when the new innovation immediately








￿A￿1, the deviator will be punished,
eliminating the pro￿ts from her new innovation.
Substituting (8) for V D








(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)
: (9)
Then, after using (2) and involved algebra, the utility of the deviating inno-
vator (6) can be rewritten as











The ￿rst two terms in the brackets in (10) capture the gain from the deviation
in the market where the deviation occurs, i.e., the di⁄erence between the
monopoly pro￿ts from the period of deviation and the forgone pro￿t stream
from collusion. The third term re￿ ects the expected loss from the deviation
in other markets in subsequent periods. In contrast to many other repeated-
game treatments of collusion, the deviating innovator can obtain positive
pro￿ts in the punishment phase. Nevertheless, comparing (5) and (9) shows
that the punishment is real in the sense that V > V D for A > 1.
Collusion can be sustained as an equilibrium when V ￿ e V or, equivalently,
by using (10), when
￿ ￿
￿






13Inserting (5) and (9) into (11) gives
1 ￿
1






￿A￿1 (I + A ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)A
￿ 0: (12)
The temptation to deviate is the greatest when n = A ￿ 1 since then the
agent￿ s share of the monopoly pro￿ts is the least. Determining the condition
for maintaining collusion in this case gives a conservative lower bound on the















Condition (13) con￿rms the usual ￿ndings concerning the sustainability of
collusion. On the one hand, it is evident that when ￿ approaches zero, col-
lusion cannot be sustained. On the other hand, when ￿ approaches unity
the left-hand side becomes greater than the right-hand side. Because the
left-hand side is an increasing function of ￿, there exist a threshold for the
discount factor, ￿, such that for all ￿ ￿ ￿ collusion can be sustained.
By totally di⁄erentiating (13) with respect to ￿, ￿, ￿, A, and I we estab-
lish the following ￿nding:
Proposition 1 The threshold level of the discount factor that makes collu-
sion possible in all markets is increasing in the level of knowledge spillovers,
the obsolescence rate and in the number of innovators. It is decreasing in the
number of ideas.
The e⁄ects of ￿ and ￿ in the model are essentially similar to the e⁄ect
14of ￿. The more likely it is that the innovations become public or obsolete,
the more likely is the exogenous break-down of collusion, and the higher
is the "e⁄ective" discount factor. The number of innovators (A) has two
opposite e⁄ects. On the one hand, the smaller is the average pro￿t to a
collusion member, the larger is the incentive to deviate. On the other hand,
the more innovators there are, the smaller is the probability of ￿nding an
idea alone, which reduces the pro￿t opportunities in the punishment phase.
Proposition 1 shows that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates. Had we evaluated the
sustainability of collusion for some n < A￿1, the e⁄ect of A would be more
ambiguous, as (12) suggests. As to the e⁄ect of I, it is reminiscent of the
result by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) that maintains that multimarket
contact facilitates collusion, because the deviator can be punished in several
markets.
5 Collusion with Patent Policy
Patent policy involves many dimensions such as patent length, strength and
height whose e⁄ects have been extensively studied in the literature. As our
main objective is to evaluate whether patent policy can be used to make
collusive behaviour more di¢ cult, we introduce the patent policy in a rather
general way by viewing patent as a probabilistic property right. We assume
that the patent strength is ￿p 2 (0;1]; which is the probability that the patent
cannot be infringed. With the complementary probability, 1-￿p, the patent
is found invalid or it can be infringed by others, driving the pro￿ts from the
innovation to zero. In our model such a patent strength is a perfect substitute
15to the patent length, measured by the number of periods a patent is in force,
in the sense that whatever policies can be achieved by using one variable
can also be achieved by the other. We choose to work with the easier one,
which is also in practice more relevant variable than the length; for instance,
vast majority of patents is voluntarily cancelled before the statutory term
has passed, and a substantial proportion of litigated patents is found invalid.
We assume that collusion combines monopoly pricing with refraining from
patenting. This assumption makes our argument transparent. It may sound
strong, but our results would be qualitatively similar if we allowed for joint
patenting. We also maintain the purpose of patent law of awarding only one
patent on the same innovation. Hence potential antitrust problems stemming
from mutually blocking patents cannot arise in our model. In conclusion we
discuss in more detail about the possibility to collude on patented innova-
tions.
As a result of the assumption, the expected life-time utility in collusion
is the same as before, i.e., it is given by (5). The utility of a deviating
agent di⁄ers considerably, since the best deviation is to patent and to get the
monopoly protected by the patent. As the patent policy is typically imperfect
(￿p < 1), the deviator takes a risk between getting a monopoly and allowing
the innovation to become public. Moreover, the worst punishment by other
innovators is to begin patenting. In other words, before the deviation the
industry is in collusion where no patents are employed but the deviation
triggers patenting. When all the innovations are patented each innovation
can be held by one agent who gets monopoly revenue from it. If multiple
agents make the same innovation, the patent holder is randomly selected
16among them and the others receive nothing.
Let us denote the innovator￿ s payo⁄ if she decides to deviate and patent
when she ￿nds an innovation with n other innovators by





















p denotes the deviator￿ s expected utility when her patent becomes
obsolete and V D
p1 when it remains useful. The interpretation of (14) is similar
to that of (6). The main di⁄erence is that the expected utility after deviation
is split into two terms, ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V D
p and V D
p1. The split is due to the protec-
tion conferred by the patent against punishment. Provided that the patent
remains useful, the deviator can enjoy monopoly pro￿ts in the market where
she has deviated also in the subsequent period. As in the case of no patent
policy (8), V D































The second term on the right-hand side of (16) comes from the possibility
that the deviator can obtain a new patent. She gets a patent with probability
17one if she innovates alone, with probability 1
2 if there is another innovator,
with probability 1







(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿p￿)
: (17)
Comparing (5) to (17) suggests that from the innovators￿point of view col-
lusion and patenting are practically equivalent. Indeed, it makes a little
di⁄erence for a risk-neutral innovator whether she gets a share of 1
k+1 of
monopoly pro￿ts for sure, or whether she gets the full monopoly pro￿ts with
probability 1
k+1.
By using (2), (3), and (15), (14) can be rewritten as














From (10) and (18) we see how the incentive to deviate is larger under the
patent system than without with. As in (10), the two ￿rst terms in the
brackets show the gain from the deviation in the market where the deviation
takes place. Without patents the deviator can derive pro￿ts only from the
period of the deviation. In contrast, under the patent system she is protected
against punishment and receives payo⁄s from the subsequent periods, unless
the innovation becomes public. The last term in (18) shows that not only the
patent protects against punishment in the market where the deviation occurs
but also in the other markets in subsequent periods. Because the collusion
can be sustained only if the term in the brackets in (18) is negative, we can
easily establish the following ￿nding.
18Proposition 2 If the patent system reduces spillovers (￿p ￿ ￿), collusion is
impossible in the patent system.
Proof. Collusion can be sustained only if V ￿ e Vp that can be rewritten
after the substitution of (5) and (17) into (18) as
n
n + 1
(1 ￿ ￿￿￿) + (￿p ￿ ￿)
￿￿
(n + 1)




The left-hand side of (19) is increasing in ￿p. Evaluating it at ￿p = ￿ shows
that it is zero when n = 0 and it is strictly positive for n ￿ 1.
The explanation for the ￿nding is straightforward. If the patent sys-
tem ful￿lls its original purpose and enhances the property rights over the
innovation, it simultaneously protects against the punishment by the former
collusion members. The ￿rst two terms in (19) capture the bene￿ts from
the deviation in the market where the deviation occurs. Even if we restrict
the attention to this single market, the protection conferred by the patent
makes collusive behaviour more di¢ cult, as in the example of Section 2. But
when the situation is repeated the protection against the punishment ex-
pands beyond the market where the deviation originally occurred, because
all innovators have an equal chance of getting a patent over new innovations.
The last term in (19) suggests that the deviator can even get higher payo⁄s
in the punishment phase than under collusion, if the patent system reduces
the spillovers. Thus a strong patent protection eliminates possibilities for an
e¢ cient punishment and maintaining collusion becomes impossible.
Because talking about collusion makes sense only if n ￿ 1, we can
strengthen the above result. To compare the ￿ndings here to the ones of
19the previous section, let us evaluate (19) at n = A ￿ 1 when the incentive
to deviate from collusion is the highest. Let us denote the threshold level of
patent strength that makes (19) hold as an equality by b ￿p, i.e., if ￿p ￿ b ￿p,
collusion is impossible under the patent system.
Proposition 3 For ￿p 2 [b ￿p;￿] the patent system both increases the spillovers
and makes collusion impossible.
Proof. We need to prove that b ￿p < ￿. Evaluating (19) at n = A￿1 and
solving for ￿p such that it holds as an equality shows that b ￿p is given by
b ￿p = ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(A ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)
￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿A]
;
which is clearly strictly smaller than ￿:
This is quite remarkable a result. Even if the patent system provides
weaker protection than secrecy, it can make collusion impossible. Moreover,
(19) suggests that for some ￿p < b ￿p collusion becomes possible but, by
continuity, it is more di¢ cult to sustain it under the patent system than
without it.
6 Welfare Discussion
So far we have taken the viewpoint of antitrust authorities and focused on
the tension between competition and patent laws that prevails in the market
after the innovation is made. The viewpoint abstracts from the e⁄ects of
patents on the incentive to innovate and consumer surplus, which are the key
questions in the literature on the patent policy. Although the literature has
20uncovered several complex e⁄ects of patents, the standard Nordhaus trade-o⁄
provides a reasonable benchmark for welfare discussion. Let us thus assume
that the incentive to innovate is increasing and consumer surplus decreasing
in ￿p and ￿.
We assume large enough ￿ to make collusion feasible and focus on an in-
dustry where innovators collude without the patent system. 3 Let us consider
the e⁄ects of introducing the patent system into the industry. Assume ￿rst
that the patent system does not a⁄ect the spillover rate, i.e., ￿p = ￿. Both
under the patent system and collusion, the innovations are monopolised un-
less they become public. Because there is no di⁄erence in the spillover rate,
the consumer surplus is identical in both cases. Similarly, the incentives to
innovate are identical, because risk-neutral innovators do not care whether
they get an equal share of monopoly pro￿ts for sure or the full monopoly
pro￿ts with an equal probability. We can therefore conclude that introduc-
ing patents into a collusive industry leaves welfare unchanged, if it leaves the
spillover rate unchanged.
Let us then allow policy-makers to control the spillover rate in the patent
system. At this juncture welfare discussion easily becomes convoluted be-
cause, as known, there can be too little or too much innovation in the market
equilibrium. If the market supports too little innovation, the policy-makers
could enhance the incentive to innovate by imposing a strong patent protec-
tion (￿p > ￿). If the market produces too much innovation, patent protection
3If the innovators do not collude without patents, the situation will reduce to the
analysis of patent policy. We refer to our earlier work (Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka, 2003) for
a characterization of optimal patent policy in a similar model of simultaneous innovation
without possibility to collude.
21can be made weak (￿p < ￿) to spread information and expand consumer sur-
plus. In our case, however, it is immaterial whether boosting the incentive to
innovate or disseminating information is desirable. Propositions 2-3 suggest
that either goal can be achieved by introducing patents practically without
concerns about the collusion. Hence, we can summarise welfare discussion in
the following result:
Proposition 4 A welfare improvement can be obtained by introducing a
patent system into a collusive industry
As to the optimal patent policy, it can be generally implemented without
making collusion easier. There is a theoretical possibility that the optimal
policy is so weak, i.e., the optimally set ￿p approaches to zero, that it facili-
tates collusion. But in practice such a policy is hardly feasible, because the
innovators will resort to secrecy if the patent protection is very weak (Kultti,
Takalo, and Toikka, 2003).
7 Conclusion
The traditional view regards the patent system as a necessary evil that
is needed to create the incentives to innovation by awarding a temporary
monopoly over an innovation. Recently many have argued that it is an un-
necessary evil. Our argument can be interpreted that perhaps there was
no evil in the ￿rst place. We show that the patent system makes collusive
behaviour more di¢ cult and often impossible. Moreover, collusion can be
impossible even if the patent system provides weak protection and, thereby,
22promotes information disclosure. It then follows that if innovative ￿rms col-
lude whenever they can, social welfare is in general higher with the patent
system than without it.
The ￿ndings are based on the two properties of the patent system. First,
patents almost by de￿nition protect against retaliation by former collusion
members in the market where deviation takes place. Second, both devia-
tors and former collusion members have an equal chance of getting a patent
on new innovations in other markets, which also limits the possibilities to
retaliate against deviations.
Our analysis yields a number of testable implications. The ￿rst is that
collusion should be less frequent in innovative industries where spillovers are
high and innovations become obsolete. The second is that collusion should be
less frequent in industries where patents provide strong protection or where
propensity to patent is high. As a result, quiet patenting activity in an in-
dustry where patenting is feasible should be looked suspiciously from the
antitrust point of view. The third hypothesis is subtler: in principle, col-
lusion should be less frequent in the ￿rst-to-￿le patent system. The other
system, which is no longer used outside the US, is based on the ￿rst-to-invent
rule, which tends to make deviation from collusion more costly. The problem
with the hypothesis is twofold. First, the ￿rst-to-invent rule sometimes al-
lows patenting by a later innovator if the ￿rst innovator has relied on secrecy.
Second, in, e.g., Europe and Japan the e⁄ect of the ￿rst-to-￿le is counterbal-
anced by the prior-user rights. Like the ￿rst-to-invent rule, prior-user rights
make deviation from collusion more costly.
Even if the testable prediction concerning the ￿rst-to-￿le vs. the ￿rst-to-
23invent rule is moot, some antitrust implication are clear. As in Denicol￿ and
Franzoni (2004) our analysis suggests that removing prior-user rights could
improve welfare since it should hamper collusion. Similarly, the exception
to the ￿rst-to-invent rule is justi￿ed: allowing a later innovator patent when
the ￿rst innovator has kept the innovation secret should make collusion more
di¢ cult. A bolder interpretation of our results supports stronger patents
and the expansion of patent subject matter in the sense that they reduce the
scope for collusion.
We believe that our analysis provides a useful ￿rst pass on the question
whether the patent policy can be used to prevent collusive behaviour. Our in-
variably a¢ rmative answer is based on a number of strong assumptions that
should be relaxed in future research. For example, we assume that under
the patent system the ￿rms collude by keeping their innovation unpatented.
In reality, ￿rms can apply for joint patents and form research joint ventures
or other joint organisations that take care of patenting. Drawing on Martin
(1996) we can speculate that such opportunities for joint patenting facilitate
collusion, because they expand possibilities to retaliate in the market where
deviation occurs. Similarly, patenting might raise antitrust concerns if in-
novators colluded on patented innovations by cross-licencing their patents
across the markets. Especially if the innovators managed to build patent
portfolios of equal sizes, they could establish a symmetric multimarket con-
tact that is conducive to collusion. Nonetheless, patents continue to protect
deviators against third parties and, in the competition for future markets,
our analysis would remain unchanged, suggesting that the patent system hin-
ders collusion even if collusion through joint patenting or cross-licensing is
24possible.
Related research (Shapiro, 2001, Lerner and Tirole, 2004) also suggests
that antitrust problems could arise from patent pools where ￿rms collude by
holding partially overlapping and blocking patents. In the context of one-shot
innovation, pooling patents would probably expand retaliation possibilities,
because deviators can be taken to court for patent infringement. If innova-
tion is repeated, the prediction is more ambiguous, since the deviators can
get non-blocking patents in future innovation periods. It is, however, little
awkward to discuss patent pools in the context of our model, because we
assume high enough patent quality so that only one patent can be awarded
among multiple innovations of the same idea. To investigate the antitrust
problems arising from patent pools in this environment would require more
careful modelling of repeated innovation with overlapping ideas and endoge-
nous patent quality, where patents on the same idea can sometimes be partial
complements and sometimes partial substitutes.
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